Of Spies and Lies: A CIA Lie Detector Remembers Vietnam

Our Expert Review

Of Spies and Lies: A CIA Lie Detector Remembers Vietnam stands as a unique and essential contribution to Vietnam War literature and polygraph studies. John Sullivan was one of the CIA's top polygraph examiners during the final four years of the war in Vietnam, where he served longer and conducted more lie detector tests than any other examiner and worked with more agents than most of his colleagues. As professional polygraph examiners ourselves, we recognize the extraordinary value of Sullivan's firsthand account of operational polygraph work in an active war zone.

Sullivan's journey from dedication to disillusionment provides readers with an unvarnished look at CIA operations during 1971-1975. Vietnam became a kind of dumping ground for poor performers, alcoholics, refugees from bad marriages, and other "problem agents." This honest assessment challenges romanticized notions of intelligence work while offering practical lessons for modern polygraph practitioners.

The book excels in its detailed exploration of polygraph methodology under extreme conditions. Sullivan's accounts of testing Vietnamese agents, prisoners of war, and even CIA personnel illuminate both the potential and limitations of polygraph examination in high-stakes environments. Chapters like "Diogenes in Vietnam" and "Operations, Vietnam Style" provide particularly valuable insights into how polygraph examinations adapted to wartime realities.

For polygraph professionals, Sullivan's descriptions of testing procedures, chart interpretation, and subject psychology offer rare field-tested knowledge. His analysis of why certain approaches succeeded while others failed provides practical guidance that remains relevant today. The book also addresses the broader context of how polygraph results were used (or misused) in intelligence decision-making.

While some reviewers have noted that certain sections become repetitive with personnel details, his description of encounters, working relationships, overtime payment and working habits becomes quite dull at times, these passages still contain valuable information about the human factors that affect polygraph effectiveness.

The book's greatest strength lies in Sullivan's balanced perspective. He discusses the roles of the CIA's three most significant players—Ted Shackley, General Charles Timmes, and Tom Polgar—from a more personal perspective than previously available and candidly portrays a rogues' gallery of cheats, scoundrels, and libertines, while also giving due credit to those who fought hard to maintain professional standards. This fairness enhances the book's credibility and educational value.

One limitation is that the book focuses exclusively on Vietnam operations, leaving readers wanting more about Sullivan's broader 31-year CIA career. Additionally, while Sullivan provides extensive detail about individual cases and personalities, some readers may find the anecdotal approach less systematic than a more structured analysis of polygraph effectiveness would provide.

Key Takeaways

• Polygraph effectiveness depends heavily on examiner skill and psychological understanding, not just the instrument itself
• Operational polygraph work requires adaptation to field conditions that may compromise ideal testing environments
• Intelligence organizations can fail despite individual competence when systemic problems undermine operations
• Language barriers and cultural misunderstandings severely limit intelligence gathering effectiveness
• Personnel problems (alcoholism, corruption, incompetence) can cascade through entire intelligence operations
• Polygraph results must be properly interpreted and integrated into broader intelligence analysis to be useful
• Field polygraph examiners often see patterns of deception and truth that escape desk-bound analysts
• Organizational pressure to produce results can lead to misuse or overreliance on polygraph findings
• The human element in intelligence work—relationships, trust, cultural sensitivity—often matters more than technical capabilities
• Historical context and political pressures significantly influence how polygraph results are received and acted upon

What’s Inside

Who Should Read This

This book offers distinct value to multiple professional audiences, each gaining different insights from Sullivan's unique perspective. Polygraph examiners will find invaluable field-tested knowledge about conducting examinations under extreme conditions, adapting procedures for different cultural contexts, and interpreting results when subjects may be motivated by survival rather than simple deception. Sullivan's detailed accounts of testing Vietnamese agents, prisoners, and CIA personnel provide practical lessons about subject psychology and examination techniques that remain relevant to modern practice. Attorneys, particularly those handling national security cases or polygraph-related litigation, will gain crucial understanding of how polygraph examinations actually function in high-stakes government operations. The book reveals the gap between idealized polygraph procedures and real-world applications, showing how organizational pressures, time constraints, and political considerations affect both the administration and interpretation of polygraph tests. This knowledge proves essential when evaluating polygraph evidence or cross-examining government polygraph examiners. Researchers and academics studying intelligence history, polygraph validity, or organizational psychology will find rich primary source material about a critical period in American intelligence operations. Sullivan's observations about why certain CIA operations failed provide valuable data points for understanding how technical capabilities interact with human factors and organizational culture. The book also offers insights into how polygraph programs evolved within intelligence agencies during the Cold War period. General readers interested in intelligence work or Vietnam War history will discover an accessible yet authoritative account that demystifies both polygraph examination and CIA operations. Sullivan's storytelling ability makes complex technical and organizational issues understandable while providing the human perspective often missing from official histories or academic studies.

About the Author

John F. Sullivan was a polygraph examiner, recruiter, and team leader with the CIA from 1968 to 1999, serving for thirty-one years total. During which time he conducted more tests than anyone in the history of the CIA's program. Born in 1939, Sullivan began his career with military service in the U.S. Army from 1962-67, achieving the rank of staff sergeant and serving in Vietnam during his military tenure.

Sullivan's CIA career spanned the height of the Cold War through its conclusion, giving him unprecedented insight into the evolution of American intelligence operations. He served longer and conducted more lie detector tests than any other examiner during the final four years of the Vietnam War and worked with more agents than most of his colleagues. His expertise in polygraph examination made him one of the Agency's most valued practitioners in this specialized field.

After retiring from the CIA in 1999, Sullivan became a lecturer with Major, Capps & Associates, which manages the Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies in Alexandria, Virginia. This post-retirement role allowed him to share his extensive knowledge with new generations of intelligence professionals. His previous book is Of Spies and Lies: A CIA Lie Detector Remembers Vietnam. He lives in Reston, Virginia.

Sullivan's unique career trajectory—from Army enlisted man to CIA's most experienced polygraph examiner—provides him with both operational and analytical perspectives rarely found in intelligence literature. His dedication to training and education through his post-retirement teaching demonstrates his ongoing commitment to improving intelligence practices and sharing hard-won operational knowledge with future practitioners.

Publication History

This book was first published on May 30, 2002 by University Press of Kansas with 264 pages in hardcover format with ISBN 978-0700611683. The book has remained in print as a single edition, maintaining its original format and content. The suggested retail price was $34.95 for the hardcover edition. University Press of Kansas, known for publishing high-quality military and intelligence history, has kept the book available through their academic distribution network. The book has been made available in both physical and digital formats through various academic and commercial channels, ensuring continued accessibility for researchers and professionals in the intelligence and polygraph communities.

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