DHS Polygraph Tests for ICE Leak Investigation: 2025

The DHS Polygraph Directive

In February 2025, DHS Secretary Kristi Noem issued Policy Statement 121-20, an internal directive dated February 12, 2025, requiring that all polygraph examinations administered by DHS include a question about unauthorized communications with media and nonprofit organizations [1]Verified DHS has begun performing polygraph tests on employees to find leakers
Confirms DHS began polygraphing employees across multiple agencies to find leakers of ICE operational information, with four sources familiar with the practice[2]Verified Noem Directs Polygraph Use to Target Homeland Security Leaks
Confirms Noem's internal directive requiring polygraph questions about unauthorized media communications, citing the 'deleterious effects' of leaks. According to a memo described to Bloomberg Government, Noem cited the "deleterious effects" of leaks on border and interior immigration enforcement operations and authorized DHS components with polygraph programs to use them to assess whether personnel should have initial or continued access to classified information [2]Verified Noem Directs Polygraph Use to Target Homeland Security Leaks
Confirms Noem's internal directive requiring polygraph questions about unauthorized media communications, citing the 'deleterious effects' of leaks.

DHS Assistant Secretary Tricia McLaughlin confirmed the directive on social media, stating: "The Department of Homeland Security is a national security agency. We can, should, and will polygraph personnel" [1]Verified DHS has begun performing polygraph tests on employees to find leakers
Confirms DHS began polygraphing employees across multiple agencies to find leakers of ICE operational information, with four sources familiar with the practice[3]Verified DHS says it 'can, should and will' administer polygraph exams amid ICE raid location leaks
Confirms DHS administers polygraphs for CBP hiring and that leaked information derailed ICE raids in Aurora and Los Angeles. The DHS main account reposted McLaughlin's statement, making the policy public [3]Verified DHS says it 'can, should and will' administer polygraph exams amid ICE raid location leaks
Confirms DHS administers polygraphs for CBP hiring and that leaked information derailed ICE raids in Aurora and Los Angeles.

By March 2025, DHS had begun performing polygraph tests on employees across multiple agencies within the department, according to four sources familiar with the practice cited by NBC News [1]Verified DHS has begun performing polygraph tests on employees to find leakers
Confirms DHS began polygraphing employees across multiple agencies to find leakers of ICE operational information, with four sources familiar with the practice. The tests specifically asked employees about leaking classified documents or sensitive law enforcement information on ICE operations [1]Verified DHS has begun performing polygraph tests on employees to find leakers
Confirms DHS began polygraphing employees across multiple agencies to find leakers of ICE operational information, with four sources familiar with the practice. The decision came after DHS leadership blamed leaked information for disrupting immigration enforcement operations. Border czar Tom Homan and Secretary Noem attributed lower-than-expected ICE arrest numbers to recent leaks about planned operations in Aurora, Colorado, and Los Angeles [1]Verified DHS has begun performing polygraph tests on employees to find leakers
Confirms DHS began polygraphing employees across multiple agencies to find leakers of ICE operational information, with four sources familiar with the practice[3]Verified DHS says it 'can, should and will' administer polygraph exams amid ICE raid location leaks
Confirms DHS administers polygraphs for CBP hiring and that leaked information derailed ICE raids in Aurora and Los Angeles. Leaked information reportedly allowed members of the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua to evade capture during federal raids [3]Verified DHS says it 'can, should and will' administer polygraph exams amid ICE raid location leaks
Confirms DHS administers polygraphs for CBP hiring and that leaked information derailed ICE raids in Aurora and Los Angeles.

Prior to this directive, no department-wide polygraph screening program existed within DHS, whose component agencies include CBP, ICE, USCIS, FEMA, the U.S. Secret Service, CISA, TSA, and the U.S. Coast Guard [4]Verified DHS Secretary Kristi Noem's Anti-Leak Polygraph Directive Disclosed
Confirms full text of Noem's Policy Statement 121-20 directive, that no prior department-wide polygraph program existed, and that Noem told Tim Pool 'We're polygraphing everybody'. To understand how these tests work and what employees face, see our complete guide to polygraph testing.

Scope and Outcomes

While the exact number of employees polygraphed was not publicly disclosed, sources told NBC News that employees from different agencies across DHS had been asked to take the tests [1]Verified DHS has begun performing polygraph tests on employees to find leakers
Confirms DHS began polygraphing employees across multiple agencies to find leakers of ICE operational information, with four sources familiar with the practice. Secretary Noem subsequently announced that DHS had identified two leakers within the department. In a video posted to X, Noem stated: "We have identified two leakers of information here at the Department of Homeland Security who have been telling individuals about our operations and putting law enforcement lives in jeopardy. We plan to prosecute these two individuals" [5]Verified Defense Department plans to use polygraph tests in investigations of leaks
Confirms DOD announced its own polygraph-based leak investigation in March 2025, Noem claimed to have identified two leakers, and DOJ launched Tren de Aragua leak probe. However, it was not clear whether those two employees had been identified specifically through polygraph testing [1]Verified DHS has begun performing polygraph tests on employees to find leakers
Confirms DHS began polygraphing employees across multiple agencies to find leakers of ICE operational information, with four sources familiar with the practice.

In a subsequent interview, Noem went further, telling broadcaster Tim Pool: "We're polygraphing everybody!" [4]Verified DHS Secretary Kristi Noem's Anti-Leak Polygraph Directive Disclosed
Confirms full text of Noem's Policy Statement 121-20 directive, that no prior department-wide polygraph program existed, and that Noem told Tim Pool 'We're polygraphing everybody'. The directive's implementation was overseen by DHS acting Chief Security Officer Iwona B. Horyn [4]Verified DHS Secretary Kristi Noem's Anti-Leak Polygraph Directive Disclosed
Confirms full text of Noem's Policy Statement 121-20 directive, that no prior department-wide polygraph program existed, and that Noem told Tim Pool 'We're polygraphing everybody'.

Notably, the DHS polygraph initiative triggered a broader federal trend. On March 22, 2025, the Department of Defense announced its own polygraph-based investigation into unauthorized disclosures of national security information [5]Verified Defense Department plans to use polygraph tests in investigations of leaks
Confirms DOD announced its own polygraph-based leak investigation in March 2025, Noem claimed to have identified two leakers, and DOJ launched Tren de Aragua leak probe[6]Verified Pentagon announces investigation into leaks, which could include polygraph tests
Confirms DOD Chief of Staff Joe Kasper's memo on polygraph-based leak investigation and referral for criminal prosecution. DOD Chief of Staff Joe Kasper wrote that the investigation would "commence immediately and culminate in a report to the Secretary of Defense," and that information identifying responsible parties would be referred for criminal prosecution [6]Verified Pentagon announces investigation into leaks, which could include polygraph tests
Confirms DOD Chief of Staff Joe Kasper's memo on polygraph-based leak investigation and referral for criminal prosecution. The Department of Justice also launched a probe into leaks of classified information related to the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua [5]Verified Defense Department plans to use polygraph tests in investigations of leaks
Confirms DOD announced its own polygraph-based leak investigation in March 2025, Noem claimed to have identified two leakers, and DOJ launched Tren de Aragua leak probe[6]Verified Pentagon announces investigation into leaks, which could include polygraph tests
Confirms DOD Chief of Staff Joe Kasper's memo on polygraph-based leak investigation and referral for criminal prosecution. For background on how polygraph testing is used in terrorism and national security investigations, see our dedicated analysis.

The CISA Polygraph Incident

The DHS polygraph program also produced a notable incident at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). In July 2025, then-acting CISA director Madhu Gottumukkala failed a counterintelligence polygraph examination needed for access to a highly sensitive intelligence program [7]Verified DHS drops investigation into former acting CISA chief's failed polygraph exam
Confirms CISA acting director failed polygraph in July 2025, staffers placed on leave, and investigation subsequently dropped in 2026. At least five career CISA staff members and one contractor involved in scheduling or approving the polygraph examinations were subsequently placed on leave [7]Verified DHS drops investigation into former acting CISA chief's failed polygraph exam
Confirms CISA acting director failed polygraph in July 2025, staffers placed on leave, and investigation subsequently dropped in 2026. The investigation was eventually closed in early 2026 and the staffers were cleared of wrongdoing, with Reps. Bennie Thompson and Eric Swalwell stating they were "pleased that the CISA personnel punished by previous DHS and CISA leadership for doing their jobs have been cleared" [7]Verified DHS drops investigation into former acting CISA chief's failed polygraph exam
Confirms CISA acting director failed polygraph in July 2025, staffers placed on leave, and investigation subsequently dropped in 2026.

The EPPA Federal Exemption

The legal framework for federal polygraph testing rests on the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988. While the EPPA prohibits most private employers from requiring polygraph tests, it explicitly exempts federal, state, and local government employers from its restrictions [8]Verified Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 — 29 CFR Part 801
Confirms that federal, state, and local government employers are explicitly exempted from the EPPA's restrictions on polygraph use. As codified in 29 CFR Part 801, the Act applies only to private employers, leaving DHS with broad authority to require polygraph examinations of its employees [8]Verified Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 — 29 CFR Part 801
Confirms that federal, state, and local government employers are explicitly exempted from the EPPA's restrictions on polygraph use. The Act also exempts certain federal contractors engaged in national security intelligence or counterintelligence functions [8]Verified Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 — 29 CFR Part 801
Confirms that federal, state, and local government employers are explicitly exempted from the EPPA's restrictions on polygraph use.

DHS already maintains an established polygraph capability. Federal law requires U.S. Customs and Border Protection to use polygraph examinations for all law enforcement positions [2]Verified Noem Directs Polygraph Use to Target Homeland Security Leaks
Confirms Noem's internal directive requiring polygraph questions about unauthorized media communications, citing the 'deleterious effects' of leaks. According to the agency's website, "Almost every Border Patrol Agent, Customs and Border Protection Officer, and Air and Marine Operations Agent who has joined CBP has taken, and passed, a Polygraph Exam" [3]Verified DHS says it 'can, should and will' administer polygraph exams amid ICE raid location leaks
Confirms DHS administers polygraphs for CBP hiring and that leaked information derailed ICE raids in Aurora and Los Angeles. However, DHS does not ordinarily require polygraph exams for employees outside of CBP [3]Verified DHS says it 'can, should and will' administer polygraph exams amid ICE raid location leaks
Confirms DHS administers polygraphs for CBP hiring and that leaked information derailed ICE raids in Aurora and Los Angeles. The Noem directive expanded polygraph usage beyond routine CBP screening into investigative territory [2]Verified Noem Directs Polygraph Use to Target Homeland Security Leaks
Confirms Noem's internal directive requiring polygraph questions about unauthorized media communications, citing the 'deleterious effects' of leaks. For more on how the EPPA affects private employers differently, see our guide to employer polygraph restrictions and our guide on polygraphing employees suspected of theft.

Executive Authority and NSDD-84

Federal polygraph programs operate under a framework of Executive Orders and agency directives. National Security Decision Directive 84 (NSDD-84), issued by President Reagan on March 11, 1983, directed all departments and agencies with employees having access to classified information to revise existing regulations so that employees may be required to submit to polygraph examinations in the course of investigations of unauthorized disclosures of classified information [9]Verified Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing: A Research Review and Evaluation
Confirms NSDD-84 authorization for polygraph use in leak investigations, OTA assessment of federal polygraph programs, and admission confirmation data[10]Verified NSDD-84 and Polygraph Policy
Confirms NSDD-84 directed agencies to require polygraph examinations in leak investigations and authorized adverse consequences for refusal. NSDD-84 also provides that refusal to take a polygraph test may result in adverse consequences such as administrative sanctions and denial of security clearance [9]Verified Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing: A Research Review and Evaluation
Confirms NSDD-84 authorization for polygraph use in leak investigations, OTA assessment of federal polygraph programs, and admission confirmation data[10]Verified NSDD-84 and Polygraph Policy
Confirms NSDD-84 directed agencies to require polygraph examinations in leak investigations and authorized adverse consequences for refusal. The directive affected approximately four million persons, including more than a million employed by private defense contractors [10]Verified NSDD-84 and Polygraph Policy
Confirms NSDD-84 directed agencies to require polygraph examinations in leak investigations and authorized adverse consequences for refusal.

The National Center for Credibility Assessment (NCCA), formerly the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute, sets technical and procedural standards for federal polygraph programs [11]Verified National Center for Credibility Assessment (NCCA)
Confirms NCCA provides graduate-level education in polygraph and credibility assessment technologies to 25 federal agencies, established 1951 as Army Polygraph School. First established in 1951 as the Army Polygraph School, the NCCA now provides graduate-level education in polygraph and credibility assessment technologies to 25 federal agencies [11]Verified National Center for Credibility Assessment (NCCA)
Confirms NCCA provides graduate-level education in polygraph and credibility assessment technologies to 25 federal agencies, established 1951 as Army Polygraph School. The NCCA also provides inspection oversight for all federal polygraph programs [11]Verified National Center for Credibility Assessment (NCCA)
Confirms NCCA provides graduate-level education in polygraph and credibility assessment technologies to 25 federal agencies, established 1951 as Army Polygraph School.

Constitutional protections still apply to federal employees. The Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination exists in criminal proceedings, though it is more limited in administrative contexts. Courts have consistently held that individuals who accept positions requiring security clearances do so with the understanding that investigative procedures — including polygraph examinations — may be required as a condition of continued employment. For a comprehensive look at polygraph licensing laws by state, see our guide.

Specific-Issue vs. Screening Examinations

Leak investigations call for specific-issue polygraph examinations rather than the broad screening examinations used during hiring. In a specific-issue exam, all relevant test questions address a single topic — in this case, whether the examinee disclosed details about planned ICE enforcement operations to unauthorized individuals.

This focused approach yields higher accuracy than multi-issue screening. According to the American Polygraph Association's meta-analytic survey, techniques designed for event-specific (single issue) diagnostic testing produced an aggregated decision accuracy of 89%, with a confidence interval of 83% to 95% [12]Verified Polygraph Validity Research — American Polygraph Association
Confirms APA meta-analytic finding of 89% aggregated decision accuracy for event-specific diagnostic polygraph testing with 83-95% confidence interval. The meta-analysis included 38 studies involving 3,723 examinations and 295 scorers [12]Verified Polygraph Validity Research — American Polygraph Association
Confirms APA meta-analytic finding of 89% aggregated decision accuracy for event-specific diagnostic polygraph testing with 83-95% confidence interval. This is consistent with the comprehensive meta-analysis by Honts, Handler, Shaw, and Gougler (2021), the largest meta-analysis ever conducted on the Comparison Question Test, which analyzed 138 datasets and found a meta-analytic effect size of 0.69 including inconclusives, with a positive linear relationship between motivation and accuracy [13]Verified A Comprehensive Meta-Analysis of the Comparison Question Polygraph Test
The largest meta-analysis ever conducted on the CQT, analyzing 138 datasets with effect size of 0.69 and positive relationship between motivation and accuracy. An earlier meta-analysis by Vrij, Mann, and Fisher (2008) found overall accuracy estimates above 85% across studies, with important moderator variables including examiner training and question format [14]Verified A Meta-Analysis of the Comparison Question Polygraph Test: Moderator Effects
Found overall CQT accuracy estimates above 85% across studies, with moderator effects including examiner training and question format.

The 2003 National Research Council report acknowledged that specific-incident polygraph tests can discriminate lying from truth telling at rates well above chance, while noting that the evidence base was stronger for specific-incident testing than for screening [15]Verified The Polygraph and Lie Detection
Confirms NRC findings on specific-incident polygraph accuracy being 'well above chance,' utility for deterrence and admissions, and concerns about screening accuracy. The NRC raised its most significant concerns about broad security screening in low-base-rate populations, a context quite different from a targeted leak investigation where specific individuals are tested about specific events [15]Verified The Polygraph and Lie Detection
Confirms NRC findings on specific-incident polygraph accuracy being 'well above chance,' utility for deterrence and admissions, and concerns about screening accuracy. A major NIJ-funded field study by Raskin, Kircher, Honts, and Horowitz (1988) demonstrated that CQT accuracy exceeded 90% when properly employed by skilled examiners in actual criminal investigations [16]Verified A Study of the Validity of Polygraph Examinations in Criminal Investigation
Major NIJ-funded field study demonstrating CQT accuracy exceeded 90% when properly employed by skilled examiners in actual criminal investigations.

Federal Zone Comparison Test (FZCT)

The Federal Zone Comparison Test is one of the APA-validated testing methods used in federal polygraph programs [12]Verified Polygraph Validity Research — American Polygraph Association
Confirms APA meta-analytic finding of 89% aggregated decision accuracy for event-specific diagnostic polygraph testing with 83-95% confidence interval. Based on the Zone Comparison Technique originally developed by Cleve Backster in 1963, the FZCT uses a structured question format that compares the examinee's physiological responses to relevant questions against their responses to comparison questions. The Federal version includes three relevant questions and uses a standardized numerical scoring system.

In the FZCT format, relevant question tracings are scored against the stronger bracketing comparison question tracings, a modification from Backster's original technique that was adopted for federal use. A version of the Zone Comparison technique has been used by federal polygraph examiners since at least the early 1960s [9]Verified Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing: A Research Review and Evaluation
Confirms NSDD-84 authorization for polygraph use in leak investigations, OTA assessment of federal polygraph programs, and admission confirmation data.

Utah Zone Comparison Test and Directed-Lie Approach

Another APA-validated technique that may be deployed is the Utah Zone Comparison Method [12]Verified Polygraph Validity Research — American Polygraph Association
Confirms APA meta-analytic finding of 89% aggregated decision accuracy for event-specific diagnostic polygraph testing with 83-95% confidence interval. Developed beginning in 1970 by David Raskin at the University of Utah, the Utah approach includes both Probable Lie Test (PLT) and Directed Lie Test (DLT) variants. The Utah directed-lie test was specifically developed to address challenges associated with comparison question standardization, including the perceived need for highly skilled examiners and the possibility that examinees may misunderstand the purpose of probable-lie questions [15]Verified The Polygraph and Lie Detection
Confirms NRC findings on specific-incident polygraph accuracy being 'well above chance,' utility for deterrence and admissions, and concerns about screening accuracy.

The Utah-CQT and corresponding Utah Numerical Scoring System resulted from over 30 years of scientific research and peer review, and the technique provides some of the highest rates of criterion accuracy and interrater reliability of any polygraph examination protocol when applied in event-specific testing. Field studies indicate the Utah-CQT maintains approximately a 90% accuracy rate in differentiating truthful from deceptive subjects [16]Verified A Study of the Validity of Polygraph Examinations in Criminal Investigation
Major NIJ-funded field study demonstrating CQT accuracy exceeded 90% when properly employed by skilled examiners in actual criminal investigations.

Question Formulation and Multi-Subject Protocols

The relevant questions in this type of leak examination would be narrowly tailored to the specific unauthorized disclosure under investigation. Federal polygraph examiners undergo extensive training at the NCCA to develop proper question formulation skills, and all questions are reviewed with the examinee before the actual test begins [11]Verified National Center for Credibility Assessment (NCCA)
Confirms NCCA provides graduate-level education in polygraph and credibility assessment technologies to 25 federal agencies, established 1951 as Army Polygraph School.

When multiple employees are tested in connection with the same leak, standardized protocols ensure consistency. The same question set is typically used across all examinees, the same technique is applied, and ideally a small team of examiners conducts all tests to minimize inter-examiner variability. The Kircher, Horowitz, and Raskin (1988) meta-analysis — the first meta-analysis of the CQT — found significant moderator effects for subject type, incentives, and decision policy, underscoring the importance of standardized protocols in multi-subject investigations [17]Verified Meta-Analysis of the Comparison Question Test
The first meta-analysis of the CQT, finding significant moderator effects for subject type, incentives, and decision policy.

The Pentagon Papers and the Creation of the 'Plumbers'

The Pentagon Papers crisis of 1971 established important precedents for government responses to classified information leaks. After Daniel Ellsberg leaked the classified Defense Department study of U.S. involvement in Vietnam to the New York Times, the Nixon administration launched aggressive efforts to stop further leaks [18]Verified 51st Anniversary of the Release of the Pentagon Papers
Confirms creation of White House Plumbers, their methods including burglary and intimidation, and the Pentagon Papers leak timeline[19]Verified Nixon and the Pentagon Papers
Confirms Nixon's response to the Pentagon Papers leak, creation of the Plumbers unit, and focus on identifying leakers. President Nixon created the White House Special Investigations Unit — known as the "Plumbers" — which was tasked with investigating confidential leaks and worked with agencies to identify the source of disclosures [18]Verified 51st Anniversary of the Release of the Pentagon Papers
Confirms creation of White House Plumbers, their methods including burglary and intimidation, and the Pentagon Papers leak timeline[19]Verified Nixon and the Pentagon Papers
Confirms Nixon's response to the Pentagon Papers leak, creation of the Plumbers unit, and focus on identifying leakers.

The Plumbers' methods infamously included burglary, bugging, and intimidation rather than formal polygraph programs [18]Verified 51st Anniversary of the Release of the Pentagon Papers
Confirms creation of White House Plumbers, their methods including burglary and intimidation, and the Pentagon Papers leak timeline. Their operations began with the break-in of Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office and culminated in the Watergate break-ins [18]Verified 51st Anniversary of the Release of the Pentagon Papers
Confirms creation of White House Plumbers, their methods including burglary and intimidation, and the Pentagon Papers leak timeline. However, the episode catalyzed federal policy around leak prevention. The broader federal framework for polygraph use in unauthorized disclosure investigations was later formalized through NSDD-84 in 1983 [9]Verified Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing: A Research Review and Evaluation
Confirms NSDD-84 authorization for polygraph use in leak investigations, OTA assessment of federal polygraph programs, and admission confirmation data[10]Verified NSDD-84 and Polygraph Policy
Confirms NSDD-84 directed agencies to require polygraph examinations in leak investigations and authorized adverse consequences for refusal. For more on how polygraph testing evolved in the post-9/11 era, see our dedicated analysis.

The Aldrich Ames Case (1994)

The Aldrich Ames espionage case remains one of the most consequential polygraph-related events in federal history. Ames, a CIA counterintelligence officer who spied for the Soviet Union and Russia beginning in 1985, passed two CIA polygraph examinations — in 1986 and 1991 — while actively engaged in espionage [20]Verified Aldrich Ames
Confirms Ames passed two CIA polygraph exams in 1986 and 1991 while spying, his betrayal compromised CIA sources, and he was arrested February 21, 1994[21]Verified An Assessment of the Aldrich H. Ames Espionage Case — Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Confirms Ames gave deceptive responses to 'pitch' questions in 1986 polygraph but was ultimately deemed truthful; provides detailed account of polygraph failures. His betrayal compromised dozens of CIA human sources, leading to the arrest and execution of numerous Soviet and Russian officials secretly working for U.S. intelligence [20]Verified Aldrich Ames
Confirms Ames passed two CIA polygraph exams in 1986 and 1991 while spying, his betrayal compromised CIA sources, and he was arrested February 21, 1994[21]Verified An Assessment of the Aldrich H. Ames Espionage Case — Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Confirms Ames gave deceptive responses to 'pitch' questions in 1986 polygraph but was ultimately deemed truthful; provides detailed account of polygraph failures.

The 1986 polygraph examination detected deceptive responses to questions about whether Ames had been "pitched" by a foreign intelligence service, but the examiner ultimately deemed him truthful after a second session [21]Verified An Assessment of the Aldrich H. Ames Espionage Case — Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Confirms Ames gave deceptive responses to 'pitch' questions in 1986 polygraph but was ultimately deemed truthful; provides detailed account of polygraph failures. Ames later explained his approach to polygraph testing: "There's no special magic. Confidence is what does it" [20]Verified Aldrich Ames
Confirms Ames passed two CIA polygraph exams in 1986 and 1991 while spying, his betrayal compromised CIA sources, and he was arrested February 21, 1994.

Ames was ultimately identified not through polygraph testing but through a joint CIA-FBI investigation. Financial analysis revealed unexplained wealth, and surveillance confirmed his espionage activities. In 1993, the CIA and FBI launched a full-scale 10-month investigation, with agents examining his finances, tapping his phone, and trailing his car [20]Verified Aldrich Ames
Confirms Ames passed two CIA polygraph exams in 1986 and 1991 while spying, his betrayal compromised CIA sources, and he was arrested February 21, 1994. He was arrested on February 21, 1994 [21]Verified An Assessment of the Aldrich H. Ames Espionage Case — Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Confirms Ames gave deceptive responses to 'pitch' questions in 1986 polygraph but was ultimately deemed truthful; provides detailed account of polygraph failures. The case prompted significant reforms to federal polygraph programs and highlighted the limitations of polygraph screening when used in isolation — while also demonstrating the critical importance of combining polygraph procedures with other investigative tools.

For more on espionage-related polygraph failures, see our analysis of Jonathan Pollard and the Naval Intelligence polygraph failure and our guide to TES-C polygraph testing for espionage, sabotage, and corruption.

The Robert Hanssen Case (2001)

The Robert Hanssen espionage case further reshaped federal polygraph policy. Hanssen, an FBI Supervisory Special Agent, spied for Soviet and Russian intelligence services off and on from 1979 to 2001 [22]Verified A Review of the FBI's Progress in Responding to the Recommendations in the OIG Report on Robert Hanssen
Confirms Hanssen was never polygraphed during 25-year FBI career, FBI expanded polygraph program from 550 to 18,384 after arrest, and case highlighted security deficiencies[23]Verified Robert Hanssen — FBI Famous Cases
Confirms Hanssen spied from 1985 to 2001, compromised human sources, was arrested February 18, 2001, and pled guilty to 15 counts of espionage. In his 25 years with the bureau, despite having access to highly sensitive sources and methods about U.S. intelligence efforts targeting the Soviet Union and Russia, Hanssen had never been subjected to a polygraph examination [22]Verified A Review of the FBI's Progress in Responding to the Recommendations in the OIG Report on Robert Hanssen
Confirms Hanssen was never polygraphed during 25-year FBI career, FBI expanded polygraph program from 550 to 18,384 after arrest, and case highlighted security deficiencies[23]Verified Robert Hanssen — FBI Famous Cases
Confirms Hanssen spied from 1985 to 2001, compromised human sources, was arrested February 18, 2001, and pled guilty to 15 counts of espionage.

The absence of polygraph examinations was identified as a significant gap in the FBI's internal security program. The DOJ Office of Inspector General found that historically, the FBI had not been in compliance with Executive Orders and Intelligence Community standards regarding internal security, including failing to require counterintelligence polygraph examinations [22]Verified A Review of the FBI's Progress in Responding to the Recommendations in the OIG Report on Robert Hanssen
Confirms Hanssen was never polygraphed during 25-year FBI career, FBI expanded polygraph program from 550 to 18,384 after arrest, and case highlighted security deficiencies. After Hanssen's arrest, the FBI implemented a counterintelligence-focused polygraph examination program, expanded its personnel security polygraph program from 550 to over 18,000 personnel subject to testing, and increased the number of random polygraph examinations administered annually [22]Verified A Review of the FBI's Progress in Responding to the Recommendations in the OIG Report on Robert Hanssen
Confirms Hanssen was never polygraphed during 25-year FBI career, FBI expanded polygraph program from 550 to 18,384 after arrest, and case highlighted security deficiencies.

Hanssen himself acknowledged the deterrent effect of polygraph testing. During debriefings, he stated that if he had thought the risk of detection was higher, he might not have continued his espionage [22]Verified A Review of the FBI's Progress in Responding to the Recommendations in the OIG Report on Robert Hanssen
Confirms Hanssen was never polygraphed during 25-year FBI career, FBI expanded polygraph program from 550 to 18,384 after arrest, and case highlighted security deficiencies. The case powerfully demonstrated that the absence of polygraph programs can create a security vulnerability — Hanssen specifically exploited the FBI's lack of routine polygraph screening [22]Verified A Review of the FBI's Progress in Responding to the Recommendations in the OIG Report on Robert Hanssen
Confirms Hanssen was never polygraphed during 25-year FBI career, FBI expanded polygraph program from 550 to 18,384 after arrest, and case highlighted security deficiencies. For a broader historical perspective, see our article on J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI's early skepticism of polygraphs.

Pre-Test Phase

The polygraph examination process begins with an extensive pre-test interview. During this phase, the examiner explains the polygraph procedure, discusses the test questions, and ensures the examinee understands each question in the same way the examiner does [15]Verified The Polygraph and Lie Detection
Confirms NRC findings on specific-incident polygraph accuracy being 'well above chance,' utility for deterrence and admissions, and concerns about screening accuracy. This shared understanding is especially important in leak investigations, where relevant questions must be precisely tailored to the specific unauthorized disclosure under investigation.

The pre-test phase serves multiple purposes. It establishes rapport between the examiner and examinee, collects background information, and shapes the expectations and emotional state of the examinee during the test [15]Verified The Polygraph and Lie Detection
Confirms NRC findings on specific-incident polygraph accuracy being 'well above chance,' utility for deterrence and admissions, and concerns about screening accuracy. All questions that will be asked during the test are reviewed with the examinee beforehand — there are no surprise questions. Federal examiners trained at the NCCA follow strict protocols during this phase [11]Verified National Center for Credibility Assessment (NCCA)
Confirms NCCA provides graduate-level education in polygraph and credibility assessment technologies to 25 federal agencies, established 1951 as Army Polygraph School.

Data Collection and Chart Analysis

During the actual examination, the polygraph instrument measures several physiological processes including cardiovascular activity, respiratory patterns, and electrodermal response [15]Verified The Polygraph and Lie Detection
Confirms NRC findings on specific-incident polygraph accuracy being 'well above chance,' utility for deterrence and admissions, and concerns about screening accuracy. The examinee answers the pre-reviewed question set while attached to the instrument, typically in multiple chart collections to ensure data reliability.

Modern federal polygraph programs increasingly use computerized scoring algorithms alongside traditional examiner evaluation. These algorithms apply standardized numerical criteria to the physiological data, reducing the potential for subjective bias. The shift toward computerized scoring addresses one of the NRC's key recommendations for improving polygraph practice [15]Verified The Polygraph and Lie Detection
Confirms NRC findings on specific-incident polygraph accuracy being 'well above chance,' utility for deterrence and admissions, and concerns about screening accuracy.

The Role of Admissions in Investigations

Research and agency experience indicate that a significant number of investigative subjects who are deceptive make admissions during the polygraph process, often during the pre-test or post-test interview phases. According to OTA survey data from federal agencies, confirmation of deceptive exam results was primarily through pre- or post-test confessions or admissions [9]Verified Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing: A Research Review and Evaluation
Confirms NSDD-84 authorization for polygraph use in leak investigations, OTA assessment of federal polygraph programs, and admission confirmation data. The 2003 NRC report acknowledged that polygraph screening may be useful for "increasing the frequency of admissions" of security violations, and that such utility derives in part from beliefs about the procedure's validity [15]Verified The Polygraph and Lie Detection
Confirms NRC findings on specific-incident polygraph accuracy being 'well above chance,' utility for deterrence and admissions, and concerns about screening accuracy.

In the context of the DHS leak investigation, the polygraph serves a dual function: it provides physiological data for analysis, and it creates an environment in which individuals who have engaged in unauthorized disclosures may be more likely to admit their actions. This admissions-generating function has been documented across federal agencies' polygraph programs and is one of the reasons polygraph testing remains a valued tool in leak investigations [9]Verified Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing: A Research Review and Evaluation
Confirms NSDD-84 authorization for polygraph use in leak investigations, OTA assessment of federal polygraph programs, and admission confirmation data.

Rights During the Examination

Federal employees retain certain rights during polygraph examinations. The test cannot be physically compelled — an employee can refuse. However, NSDD-84 explicitly provides that refusal to take a polygraph test in the course of an unauthorized disclosure investigation may result in adverse consequences including administrative sanctions and denial of security clearance [9]Verified Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing: A Research Review and Evaluation
Confirms NSDD-84 authorization for polygraph use in leak investigations, OTA assessment of federal polygraph programs, and admission confirmation data[10]Verified NSDD-84 and Polygraph Policy
Confirms NSDD-84 directed agencies to require polygraph examinations in leak investigations and authorized adverse consequences for refusal.

Employees have the right to understand all test questions before the examination begins. They have the right to terminate the examination at any point. If the examination produces a deceptive result, the employee has the right to be informed and given an opportunity to explain the results. Polygraph results alone typically cannot serve as the sole basis for adverse action — agencies are expected to corroborate findings through additional investigation.

Consequences of Refusal

For DHS employees ordered to take a polygraph in connection with the leak investigation, refusal carries serious professional consequences. Under NSDD-84 and subsequent Intelligence Community directives, employees who refuse lawfully ordered polygraph examinations risk loss of security clearance, reassignment from sensitive positions, administrative action, or termination [9]Verified Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing: A Research Review and Evaluation
Confirms NSDD-84 authorization for polygraph use in leak investigations, OTA assessment of federal polygraph programs, and admission confirmation data[10]Verified NSDD-84 and Polygraph Policy
Confirms NSDD-84 directed agencies to require polygraph examinations in leak investigations and authorized adverse consequences for refusal.

The practical impact of these consequences is significant. For DHS employees in law enforcement or intelligence roles, loss of security clearance effectively ends their ability to perform their duties. Courts have generally upheld agencies' authority to draw adverse inferences from refusal to take a polygraph when such testing is authorized by law or directive. For employees who may face these tests, our guide on what happens if you fail a police polygraph provides relevant context.

A New Era of Federal Polygraph Expansion

The DHS and DOD polygraph initiatives of 2025 signal a significant expansion of federal polygraph use under the Trump administration. Three federal departments — DHS, DOD, and DOJ — launched parallel leak investigations within a single month, all incorporating or contemplating polygraph testing [5]Verified Defense Department plans to use polygraph tests in investigations of leaks
Confirms DOD announced its own polygraph-based leak investigation in March 2025, Noem claimed to have identified two leakers, and DOJ launched Tren de Aragua leak probe[6]Verified Pentagon announces investigation into leaks, which could include polygraph tests
Confirms DOD Chief of Staff Joe Kasper's memo on polygraph-based leak investigation and referral for criminal prosecution. This represents the most aggressive federal deployment of polygraph testing for leak investigations since the Reagan-era NSDD-84 framework was established in 1983 [10]Verified NSDD-84 and Polygraph Policy
Confirms NSDD-84 directed agencies to require polygraph examinations in leak investigations and authorized adverse consequences for refusal.

DHS employs more than 260,000 people across its component agencies, making it the third-largest Cabinet department [24]Verified DHS Mission Areas
Confirms DHS employs more than 260,000 people and is the third-largest Cabinet department. The expansion of polygraph testing from CBP's established hiring program to a department-wide investigative tool represents a substantial scaling of polygraph operations. The practical challenges of administering polygraph examinations to large numbers of employees across multiple agencies are considerable, requiring trained examiners, standardized protocols, and quality assurance measures.

The initiatives also raise important questions about the balance between national security imperatives and employee rights. Civil liberties organizations have expressed concerns about the potential chilling effect on whistleblower activity, while national security advocates argue that unauthorized disclosures of operational information endanger law enforcement personnel and compromise mission effectiveness.

Lessons from the 2025 DHS Experience

The DHS experience offers several key lessons for federal polygraph policy. First, the directive demonstrated that existing legal authority — particularly the EPPA exemption for government employers and NSDD-84 — provides a robust foundation for deploying polygraph testing in leak investigations without additional legislative action [8]Verified Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 — 29 CFR Part 801
Confirms that federal, state, and local government employers are explicitly exempted from the EPPA's restrictions on polygraph use[9]Verified Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing: A Research Review and Evaluation
Confirms NSDD-84 authorization for polygraph use in leak investigations, OTA assessment of federal polygraph programs, and admission confirmation data.

Second, the announcement that DHS identified two leakers highlighted the investigative value of polygraph programs, though it remained unclear whether the identifications resulted directly from polygraph testing or from parallel investigative methods [1]Verified DHS has begun performing polygraph tests on employees to find leakers
Confirms DHS began polygraphing employees across multiple agencies to find leakers of ICE operational information, with four sources familiar with the practice. This ambiguity underscores the importance of viewing polygraph testing as one component of a comprehensive investigative approach rather than a standalone solution.

Third, the CISA polygraph incident — where the acting director failed a counterintelligence polygraph and staffers who arranged it were placed on leave — illustrated the political complexities that can arise when polygraph programs intersect with organizational leadership [7]Verified DHS drops investigation into former acting CISA chief's failed polygraph exam
Confirms CISA acting director failed polygraph in July 2025, staffers placed on leave, and investigation subsequently dropped in 2026. The subsequent clearing of those staffers affirmed the principle that career security professionals should not face retaliation for faithfully executing their mission [7]Verified DHS drops investigation into former acting CISA chief's failed polygraph exam
Confirms CISA acting director failed polygraph in July 2025, staffers placed on leave, and investigation subsequently dropped in 2026.

For polygraph examiners seeking to work in federal settings, our guide to CIA polygraph examiner careers and the CIA polygraph exam candidate guide provide valuable career information. For those interested in the evolving landscape of polygraph training, see our overview of PEAK CATC polygraph training courses.